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Sacred Appellations
Secular Zen, New Materialism, and D. T. Suzuki’s Soku-hi Logic
The logic of soku-hi is presented as an articulation of a post-Kantian view of 
reality that embraces the truths of science with the assumption of the tran-
scendental subject. As such, soku-hi represents the philosophical posture 
of both the secular Zen of the Kyoto School and the new materialists of 
contemporary continental philosophy. It describes how material reality is 
not all even though there is nothing else.
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Science can never be defeated. It points at what is actually there and noth-ing other, and will keep pointing regardless of how much we may wish 
away what we see before our eyes. There is no argument against direct empir-
ical pointing. The myths, the magic, the mystical mysterious that point at the 
unseen are no match for the hard wallop of the indisputably visible. But if it 
is the case that only the empirical, what is “actually” there can be claimed to 
be true, where is there “space” for religion or God? Is the triumph of science 
absolute and total? Has the meta-hypothesis of science removed Him from 
our cosmologies, making atheism the only rational description possible?1 I 
seek here to demonstrate through an exploration of D. T. Suzuki’s soku-hi 
logic how secular Zen, that Kyoto School creation, has embraced the non-
scientific and non-rational, the space where religion and God can still lurk, 
whilst agreeing with the basic claims of scientific and empirical enquiry. In 
doing so, secular Zen has followed much of what contemporary continental 
philosophy, in the guise of new materialism, has to say, albeit with impor-
tant moments of divergence.
1. Nishitani Keiji has also posed this question, stating that the standpoint of modern atheism
seeks to ground itself from start to finish in actual being. This is related to the denial of God, 
in that full engagement of the self in actual being requires a denial of having already been 
determined within the world-order established by God, as well as a denial of having been fit-
ted out in advance with an orientation to God in one’s very soul. Both standpoints stress the 
importance of not becoming detached from the locus in which one ‘actually’ is, of remain-
ing firmly grounded in one’s actual socio-historical situation, or more fundamentally, in 
actual ‘time’ and ‘space.’ But do these standpoints [of modern atheism] really engage actual 
being to the full? (Nishitani 1990, 189–90)
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Religion and science
From the earliest moments of his intellectual career, D. T. Suzuki 
was concerned about the relationship between science and religion. He 
believed that religion should not deny the claims of science. Rather, religion 
should embrace science to purify itself of its own superstitions and pointless 
rituals.2 However, Suzuki felt that science and, indeed, philosophy (which 
he saw as involving exclusively dualistic rational thinking) could only go so 
far in explaining the truths of human existence. Science and rational think-
ing (“philosophy” in Suzuki’s terminology) are based on a dualistic and 
linear mode of enquiry, forever moving forward with new data and informa-
tion. In other words, science is not structurally designed to ever grasp the 
full truth of human life. Truth is always deferred to the future, awaiting one 
final piece of confirming data that never comes. Religion, though, is circular 
where science is linear.3 It grasps the unity that is now. But to say that reli-
gion is circular and non-differentiating where science is linear and (dualisti-
cally) differentiating, and at the same time to acknowledge the compatibility 
between both positions (Suzuki never rejects science, we must remember) 
involves embracing a frame of mind that clearly acknowledges and conforms 
to the absolute contradictions of this posture. Suzuki’s soku-hi logic was one 
clear articulation of this posture, and it was an articulation that has been 
echoed elsewhere, explicitly in the Kyoto School, but also, I hope to demon-
strate, implicitly in large swathes of contemporary continental philosophy. 
Science and religion are, of course, both slippery concepts and we must 
be mindful that both camps and each philosopher within may have different 
understandings of what each concept means. However, the important point 
is that both groups see science as a form of knowledge about the world that 
constantly effaces its own grounds for its own operation. Science is “done” 
by people who must effectively pretend that it is not they that are “doing” it, 
that it is just happening, it is just done. For instance, Nishitani comments: 
“Science is not something separate from the people who engage in it, and 
that engagement, in turn, represents only one aspect of human knowledge.”4 
2. Suzuki, 2001a.
3. This circularity versus linearity theory was also present in the thinking of Suzuki’s mentor 
Imakita Kōsen (see Suzuki 2001b).
4. Nishitani 1982, 46.
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In a similar vein, Althusser embraces the philosopher of science, Gaston 
Bachelard, with the result that, as Pfieffer points out:
Because for both Althusser and Bachelard, science and scientific knowledge 
are products of the practices that science engages in, there is no “external” 
check on that knowledge that proves that it is “objective.” In other words, 
science and scientific knowledge—even insofar as it is able to overcome the 
Bachelardian “web of beliefs”—is produced solely within the realm of a given 
set of scientific practices and concepts.5 
Similarly religion is seen by both groups as not so much the practices and 
rituals out there in the world as the beliefs within the mind of the believer. 
Religion is foremost ideological, a belief system that asserts that the material 
is not all, that there is a beyond, a realm of knowledge, whether true, and 
hence believed, or simply felt, and hence false, that science cannot touch on. 
Secular zen and new materialism
To gather up in one bumpy bundle the pile of gravelly concepts 
that is Suzuki’s Zen philosophy, I will use the term “secular Zen.”6 It can be 
defined as seeking religious certainty prior to religious affiliation, where 
said religious certainty does not wholly reject the paradigm of what can be 
described as the scientific, empiricist, naturalist, or materialist standpoint. 
(Of course “Zen” itself is a religious affiliation but this paradox is part of its 
pleasure.) I will be contrasting secular Zen with a group of contemporary 
continental philosophers dubbed the “new materialists” by Geoff Pfeifer, 
namely Louis Althusser, Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek.7 I will chart how 
5. Pfeifer 2015, 20.
6. A 1916 work by D. T. Suzuki, entitled 『禅の第一義』(2011) has been republished with the 
subheading “The Primary Purpose of Western Zen” emblazed on its front cover. The book is in 
Japanese but this subheading is written in English with no translation. We can behold here a 
semiotic move that would take a whole army of cultural studies scholars to decode. However, 
my quick, spontaneous interpretation of this book cover title is to see it is as a way of distancing 
Suzuki from the orthodoxy of Zen as institutionally practiced in Japan, whilst paying homage 
to Suzuki’s intellectual validity and creativity. I will follow this example and see Suzuki as the 
articulation of a new tradition of “secular” (i.e., “Western”) Zen, without worrying too much 
about issues of institutional legitimacy or heterodoxy. 
7. Pfeifer 2015. 
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soku-hi logic encapsulates the secular Zen standpoint, while at the same 
time, articulating core sections of the new materialist position. Both follow 
a common trajectory but with a final and vital split emerging at the end.
Soku-hi




We can translate it as “a is a implies a is not a, therefore a is a.”9 Suzuki 
asserts that this is the form of argumentation the Diamond Sutra engages 
in, asserting something, then negating it, then reasserting it on the basis 
of that negation.10 For instance, the sutra states, as translated by Suzuki in 
A Manual of Zen Buddhism: “all these many particles of dust are no-parti-
cles of dust and therefore that they are called particles of dust.”11
Suzuki claims that his soku-hi logic is a description of prajña-intuition, a 
core concept in Mahayana Buddhism.
a is a
Let us look at the first step in this logical formulation: a is a. This is a 
8. Suzuki, 2001c.
9. Another possible translation, as presented by Wayne S. Yokoyama, is “For a to be affirmed 
as a, a has to be non-a; therefore, it is a.” Yokoyama 2011, 216. 
10. Suzuki’s translation of this aspect of the Diamond Sutra has been disputed and seen as 
inaccurate by some. For instance, Tachikawa has commented on 
the paradoxical expression that “a is non-a. Therefore it is called a” that repeatedly appears 
in the Diamond Sutra means “a is non-existent. Therefore, it is worded as a.” The domain of 
discourse of the proposition “a is non-a” is not the whole, but a. Therefore, the phrase “a is 
non-a” should be interpreted to mean that “the being that is considered to exist in the name 
of a is in reality non-existent,” not that “a is all the things other than a.” In line with this 
argument, we have no reason to assume that an unconventional logic governs the Diamond 
Sutra. (Tachikawa 2002, 209–10.)
The fact that a possible mistranslation has helped in the expression and conceptual develop-
ment of secular Zen demonstrates the creative and dialogic nature of translation in the devel-
opment of religion and philosophy in human history. Indeed, I have myself penned a humble 
monograph which ruminates on this very subject. See Ó Muireartaigh 2015.
11. Suzuki 1960, 44. 
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description of the world that is very much in keeping with that of core sci-
entism, naturalism, paleo-materialism, empiricism, or any such ideology 
which sees the world of nature, and our representation of it, as stable and 
coherent. In this view, objects have their own coherence apart from humans. 
An apple is an apple and can be “seen” as an apple even without humans. 
a is a is where every object and every event in the universe can be labelled 
and related to the whole, the collection of all other objectively identifiable 
objects and events in the world. There is nothing else going on but this 
world, and the things (“a”s) in it. It is the world being as it is in its “actuality.”
a is not a
Why would a not be a? Most generally, in the continental philosophical 
tradition, the assertion of a’s non-a-ness can be derived from the idea of the 
Kantian transcendental (rather than transcendent) subject (which the con-
dition of a being a is dependent upon), and the family of concepts and posi-
tions that have derived from this assumption ever since.12 To argue why a is 
not a, when we include the transcendental subject, we can follow a number 
of commonly trod steps that have been taken, with alternate terminologies, 
by those in the secular Zen and new materialism traditions.
The notion of a filtered world
This here is the idea that the conscious self existing in the world cannot be 
one more object in the world. What this means in effect is that a being a is a 
subjective imposition or filtering without which there would be no world of 
a is a, but only a cosmic mush of eternal non-differentiated a-ness. We exist 
in the world but filter that world which means: (1) As filters, we are outside 
the set of all that is being filtered. We cannot be included in the world. To 
repeat, we are not one more object in the world. Atman is anatman, self is 
12. As Slavoj Žižek explains:
When I misperceive some object in my phenomenal reality, when I mistake it for a different 
object, what is wrong is not that I am unaware of how things “really are in themselves” but 
of how they really appear to me. One cannot overestimate the importance of this Kantian 
move. Ultimately, philosophy as such is Kantian and it should be read from the vantage 
point of the Kantian revolution, namely, not as a naïve attempt at “absolute knowledge” as a 
total description of the entirety of realty, but as the work of deploying the horizon of preun-
derstanding presupposed in every engagement with entities in the world.” (Žižek 2003, 
44–5)
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no-self. The filtering atman of self cannot be ascribed positive existence since 
this would put it on the other side, as in that which is being filtered and not 
the filter itself. (2) Our filters cannot be absolute truth. We sift truth, break 
it down into bits, destroy its essential totality, and leave out the truth of its 
utter interpenetration. We see only the partial truths we have constructed 
with our filters. The world looks coherent to us not because that is how it 
really is but because we have made it so.
Difference first
The next step is to recognize that difference, not object, is primordial in our 
world. (This is how filters work, they “make” objects through their prior dif-
ferentiating function.) One clear way of expressing this idea is the Derridean 
notion of différance. This is how Geoffrey Bennington explains it:
Identities in general (of whatever kind, at whatever level) arise out of differ-
ence, but difference is not itself any thing at all. It is not that there are first 
things, and then differences and relations between them: the “things” emerge 
only from the differences and relations, which have an absolute priority, and 
that emergence is never complete. It’s that insight that led to the neologism 
différance.13
While neither secular Zen nor new materialism explicitly use the term 
différance, the posture it expresses (“difference is not itself any thing at all”) 
can be traced and delineated in both. Différance is found in much of Kyoto 
School thought in the idea that the world is not about constant separate “a”s 
emerging in nature but how these “a”s, as the products of difference and rela-
tions, are masking how their own supposed absolute differentiation is the 
outcome of a prior undifferentiatedness.14 This prior undifferentiatedness 
cannot be one more a (as in the mass of all “a”s together) in the world, so 
it is emptiness (空). In other words, any view that embraces difference to be 
primordial must also acknowledge the unifying realm from which this dif-
ference is to emerge, and also understand that this realm is not a prior step 
in a chain of differentiation but the immanent grounding and place of the 
differentiation. As Nishitani describes it, “that all things are severally what 
13. Bennington, 2016. 
14. For a detailed description of the resonance of différance with Kyoto School thinking, see 
Kopf 2011.
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they are in themselves directly implies that they are all collected together. 
Such is the field of emptiness.”15 The point being that when we see a as a we 
are seeing the outcome of that prior realm of absolute emptiness. This is not 
the interplay of a turning into non-a, or a emerging from where there was 
the emptiness of non-a, nor is it the sum of all amounting to zero through 
pluses and minuses, but is the very condition of a when the self as non-self 
is to be accounted for. This mirrors the comments by Slavoj Žižek regard-
ing difference between “everything is matter” and “there is nothing which is 
not matter.” For Žižek, the difference “that a truly radical materialism is by 
definition nonreductionist: far from claiming that ‘everything is matter,’ it 
confers upon ‘immaterial’ phenomena a specific positive nonbeing.” Žižek 
is reacting against the crude materialism where a is a (to borrow Suzuki’s 
description), and emptiness has no positive value. Žižek writes, “when we 
imagine the Whole of reality, there is no longer any place for consciousness 
(and subjectivity). There are two options here: either subjectivity is an illu-
sion, or reality is in itself (not only epistemologically) not-All.”16
Overdeterminism
“a is a” as the world of discreet stable identities is also the world of identifi-
able and discreet causes and effects. If we picture a world at one instance, 
we see a world where all is divided synchronically into its unit components. 
If we picture the world then at the very next moment in time, there is still 
a division of the world into discreet units, but this division has changed 
somewhat. There are now different units, new units have replaced old ones. 
In other words, there has been a movement in the world, and units in the 
prior instant have caused, and can be linked to, all the new units that have 
appeared in the current present world. 
However, when “a is a and is not a,” the act of delineating what is moving 
and what has moved between any two instances of time becomes an act of 
arbitrary heuristics. Which causes are necessary and which are contingent 
is a judgment, not a measurable quantity. In fact, when a is not a, it is the 
everything that is causing the all to change between any two instances of 
time. There is not a chain of being, but ruptures of events which can never 
15. Nishitani 1981, 192. 
16. Žižek 2006, 168.
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be fully explained except through fictions of cause and effect relations 
edited from the sum of all. In this vision of Althusserian overdetermination 
or Buddist pratītyasamutpāda (co-dependent arising) there are still possible 
rankings of causes, between the contingent and the necessary, the hetu and 
the pratyaya, but necessities are distinguished from contingencies in an ulti-
mately contingent way since the only necessity is the all, or rather the empti-
ness of all.17
Ideology
To briefly recap, I have followed a chain of argument that posits the tran-
scendental self, and sees this self as filtering or imposing the identification 
that makes a to be a. This act of imposition makes difference primordial to 
the object that is defined as a, and when all is put in motion and a changes 
into what it is not, this is on account of causal relations that are non-linear, 
over-determined and which can only be implied in a partial sense since any 
final account of causality would be total and hence neither descriptive nor 
useful. This lack of fit between the world out there and the world as we are 
imposing it can be referred to as ideology. Ideology is our most basic experi-
ence of truth, as in a is a, the reality that is there in its “actuality.” However, 
it is ideology that is making a to be a. In other words, there is a contingency, 
an imposition on a site or field where a is not a. That is to say, a is not abso-
lutely a, nor either is it anything else (like “b”). It is a site of infinite other 
possible configurations.
The contingency of a is a works when it is experienced as absolute. Yet, 
as an absolute, this a is a masks the fact that a is not a. Why does ideology 
do this? Because in our reading of the world (“a”s being “a”s) we cannot take 
into account (structurally) the position of the reader (which should be one 
more “a”). The eye sees by not seeing itself. Similarly, consciousness qua ide-
17. For example Louis Althusser states: “instead of thinking contingency as a modality of 
necessity, or an exception to it, we must think necessity as the becoming necessary of the en-
counter of contingencies.” Quoted in Pfeifer 2015, 6. 
Similarly, Imakita Kōsen (D. T. Suzuki’s sensei) explained that the Buddhist distinction be-
tween direct and indirect cause (hetu and pratyaya) should be seen in unison in a world where, 
due to absolute interpenetration, the myriad things do not come or disappear, increase or de-
crease (不生不滅不増不減). Suzuki 2001b, 219.
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ological action works by effacing itself. This notion is expressed in Suzuki’s 
account of vijñāna (in contrast to prajña). 
Vijñāna is not the creator of the logical law, but it works by means of the law. 
Vijñāna takes it as something given and not provable by any means devised 
by vinjana, for vijñāna itself is conditioned by it. The eye cannot see itself; 
to do this a mirror is needed, but what it sees is not itself, only its reflection. 
Vijñāna may devise some means to recognize itself, but the recognition turns 
out to be conceptual, as something postulated.18
And so both new materialism and secular Zen follow the same story in 
their crushing of positivist a is a-ism. However, both face the same problem 
where a is a meaning a is not a can descend into relativist incoherence or 
even deeper ideologically masked fantasies of certitude, as in the self-validat-
ing, but ultimately self-deluding, notion that one sees the true fluidity of the 
world in a way that nobody else does.
Therefore a is a
However, both new materialism and secular Zen go one step further to 
assert that “therefore a is a,” the fact is that a can only ever be a. There 
is no place where a is not a can happen. There is no transcendence from 
the world of positive existence. We are stuck in our world of “a”s. There is 
no escaping this. Similarly there is no escaping ideology. There is no no-
ideology, no no-samsara. The idea that one can remove the false view that a 
is a and see the world as it really is, is itself an ideological fantasy. In other 
words, the metaphor is not about taking off the rosy distorting glasses of 
false delusion and seeing the true world out there, but rather the metaphor 
is about the eye being able to see itself seeing. This is of course impossi-
ble, as is any escape from ideology. This impossibility then, and the aporia, 
antinomy, and parallax that expresses it, is necessary and structural. Taking 
away this impossibility would mean indulging in the ultimate ideological 
blindness.
The solution is not to try and overcome or transcend the impossibility 
but to embrace it. What is to be embraced and what this embracing involves 
can be better understood if we take into consideration the two acts of “see-
ing” we are discussing here. The first type of seeing is simply the case of you 
18. Suzuki 1955, 120–21.
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seeing the world and objects and events in it. The second type of seeing is 
you seeing the impossibility of seeing “seeing” itself. This second type of see-
ing involves pure freedom in that this act can never be automatic. Only you 
can consciously decide to engage in this act of seeing. It cannot be done for 
you. It is that part of human consciousness that, for instance, ai (where ai 
is designed in a mechanical, computational, and modularly composite way) 
will never reach or replicate. 
The aporia has consequently deepened in that not only do we face the 
impossibility of ever seeing ourselves seeing (when in fact seeing ourselves 
seeing is our deepest moment of self-conscious certitude), but now we also 
face the fact that we are both absolutely determined and absolutely free. We 
are absolutely determined in that our act of “seeing” the world is biologically 
derived. We are one more object in the world and as such utterly embedded 
in the events of the world as much as any other part of nature. But we are 
also absolutely free in that we can choose to break out of this act of seeing 
the world and decide to see ourselves seeing the world (with the impossibili-
ties of this seeing being ultimately what it is that is seen). This second type of 
seeing cannot be ultimately linked to physical causation. It is not part of the 
great chain of being but is something that erupts from pure self-will. Thus, 
freedom and determinism both equally describe our condition. Jiriki (自力) 
and tariki (他力) are one and the same.
But let me go further and assert that it is from this ability to see oneself 
seeing that arises the social and the religious. When we see ourselves seeing 
the world, the idea that the world sees us back arises. This is not necessar-
ily a logical conclusion but rather a potent and inadvertent intuition. The 
eyes of the other is felt to be endowed with the same pure freedom that we 
experience within ourselves. When another looks at you, you know they 
know you are there. However, tied in with this social sense of being, there 
is also a sense that the world itself en masse is looking at you and knowing 
you. There is what we can describe as an uber-consciousness out there. A 
personality in and beyond the world that sees you and knows you. There is a 
big Other, a God. Again, this is not a logical conclusion but something that 
we seem to be primed to sense from the most primordial beginnings of our 
conscious life.
So far, then, secular Zen and new materialism are still together and 
in accord. But it is at this point that the two diverge. In the concluding 
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remarks to his book on the new materialists, Pfieffer makes an interesting 
link between the new materialists and the sociologist Emile Durkheim. 
Basically, the connection is the fact that Durkheim saw the existence of the 
social not as the sum of all individual minds in a given society, but as a col-
lective consciousness out there, beyond, but only ever to be experienced by 
individuals. It is this social that is the source of the sacred in the world. It is 
consciousness, it is out there beyond the self, but is only really ever in the 
self, and as such, it is never transcendent of the world. It is imminent in the 
material. Pfieffer observes: 
We might argue that, for both Badiou and Zizek, what is new in their mate-
rialism is the newness found in the rebirth of the old claim to universalism, 
but here encountered in a new form—as appearing within existence (and not 
as external to it). Here again the Durkheimian conception of the “sacred” is 
relevant, as whatever is “sacred,” and hence collective, appears materially in 
effervescent moments, and it becomes a matter of figuring out how to sustain 
those moments. As Badiou puts it at the end of Logics of Worlds, “But I need 
neither God, nor the divine. I believe that it is here and now that we arouse 
or resurrect ourselves as Immortals.”19
However, whereas the new materialists see the social in the sacred, the 
secular Zen tradition sees the sacred in the social. The fundamentally Dur-
kheimian idea is that when humans group together and engage in rituals, 
these rituals, although of sacred meaning, are ultimately about group solidar-
ity. By contrast, secular Zen sees group solidarity and the love of neighbor it 
implies, as emanating from a deeper “field,” to borrow Nishitani’s term, that 
is of a religious (i.e., beyond the material) nature.20 The case in point being 
Nishida who, speaking for secular Zen, sees the God of the social other as, 
indeed, God. The other is the space where God emerges. There is no other 
place for God to be. God coemerges with the self. Nishida writes:
Our self is established as the affirmation of the absolute self-negation of 
God, and… this is real creation. The absolute does not merely transcend the 
relative. If that were so, it would be merely negative, while in actuality it is 
relative. The true absolute faces its own absolute self-negation and embraces 
absolute negation within itself: it mediates itself in an absolutely contradi-
19. Pfeifer 2015, 137.
20. Nishitani 1982, 284–85.
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catorily self-identical way through absolute negation—as the logic of soku-hi 
as the Diamond Sutra has it. Our self is established through God’s absolutely 
negating self-mediation; it exists at the outer limit of the self-negation of the 
absolute one into the individual many. Therein our self, the self-projecting 
point of the absolute one, is the image of God and absolutely volitional.21 
Unpacking this statement, we can see that Nishida is asserting God as that 
which co-emerges with the self. This assertion can be grounded on the fact 
that the absolute, that which includes all, cannot have a positive value, be 
one more thing in the world, nor can it be the whole world added up either 
(such an adding up would remove the self ). It can only be understood as the 
contradictory condition of the existence of the self in the world, the fact 
that the world is not where the self is but is not not there as that place where 
the self exists as itself. To put it in other terms, the big Other will stand in 
opposition to us at that moment our consciousness is generated from and as 
our self. The world out there where the big Other lurks is identified as being 
everything that is not one’s self, despite being utterly depended on one’s self 
for its identification. There is no other means by which to resolve this innate 
contradiction of the self in the world than to see it as the very site of con-
sciousness and meaning in the world. The self and the other creating each 
other by not being each other but never coherently separating on account of 
this act of absolute self-mediation that unites through the very act of sepa-
ration points to a deeper non-differentiating, or rather pre-differentiating 
consciousness wherein lurks the religious. Let us follow Suzuki in calling 
this prajña. As Suzuki explains:
Prajña, however, is the eye that can turn itself within and see itself, because it 
is the law of identity itself. It is due to prajña that subject and object become 
identifiable, and this is done without mediation of any kind. Vijñāna always 
needs mediation as it moves on from one concept to another—this is in the 
very nature of vijñāna. Therefore, it swings the staff; sometimes it asserts; 
sometimes it negates, and declares that “a is not-a and therefore a is a.” This 
is the “logic” of prajña-intuition.22 
21. Nishida 1987, 85–6.
22. Suzuki 1955, 121.
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Conclusion
Both new materialism and secular Zen agree that the existence of 
the self in the world creates an inherent structural contradiction that gener-
ates identity and meaning but is undermining of that meaning in its very 
operation. There is a gap in the cosmos, and here can lurk the space for God. 
Is it a case of the oft-spoken gap of the God, that fantasy we use to plug in the 
gaps in our knowledge, or the God of the gap, that which emerges because 
the meaning out there in the world, the sense of the Other beyond but with 
us, is meant to be known. There is meaning in the world because the world 
is meaningful. Where Lacanians may see the big Other as God that emerges 
with the development of consciousness as fantasy, Nishida sees it as a “real 
creation.” No science will ever resolve this issue. It is the logic of soku-hi, the 
very fabric of reality.
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